

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 05591 01 OF 03 022344Z

73

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-04 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-06 IO-10 ISO-00

AEC-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NASA-01

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 RSC-01

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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USUN 5591

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PAGE 02 USUN N 05591 01 OF 03 022344Z

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM UN

SUBJ: UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE DISARMAMENT WRAP-UP: NONPROLIFERATION AND RELATED NUCLEAR ISSUES

THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES. HIGHLIGHTS OF DEBATE ON OTHER DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS IN FIRST COMMITTEE PROVIDED SEPTTEL.

1. SUMMARY: NONPROLIFERATION AND RELATED NUCLEAR ISSUES WERE PRINCIPAL ITEMS IN THIS YEAR'S FIRST COMMITTEE DISARMAMENT DEBATE. ENCOURAGING NUMBER OF WESTERN, SOVIET BLOC, AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES RECOGNIZED CHALLENGE POSED BY INDIAN TEST AND RALLIED AROUND NPT AND NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVE. SECRETARY'S SEPT. PLENARY ADDRESS & SEN. SYMINGTON'S COMMITTEE SPEECH WERE USEFUL RE-AFFIRMATIONS OF INTENSE US CONCERN ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. INDIAN OBJECTIONS TO RESES OR PORTIONS OF RESES DEALING WITH NONPROLIFERATION WERE SHARED BY ONLY A HANDFUL OF DELEGATIONS. HOWEVER, INDIA APPARENTLY CHOSE NOT TO LOBBY ACTIVELY ON NPT RELATED QUESTIONS, SO UNEXPECTEDLY FAVORABLE FIRST COMMITTEE OUTCOME MIGHT NOT BE ENTIRELY ACCURATE REFLECTION EITHER OF RECEPTIVITY TO INDIAN ARGUMENTS OR OF STRENGTH OF NON-PROLIFERATION SENTIMENT. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED VIEW THAT FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES) HAVE NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED AND CALLED FOR FURTHER INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATION OF PNE ISSUES. THERE WAS MUCH SUPPORT FOR IDEA THAT, IF PNES ARE PROVIDE WORTHWHILE, NON-DISCRIMINATORY INTERNATIONAL PNE SERVICE AS ENVISAGED IN NPT ARTICLE V WOULD NEED TO BE SET UP. INDIAN TEST CONTRIBUTED TO HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN REGIONAL APPROACH TO NONPROLIFERATION, AS EVIDENCED BY ADOPTION OF SEVEN RESOLUTIONS ON NUCLEAR FREE ZONES (NFZS) WIDE MARGINS BY WHICH RESOLUTIONS WERE ADOPTED, HOWEVER, REFLECTED ASSEMBLY'S GENERAL ENCOURAGEMENT FOR CONCEPT OF NFZS RATHER THAN ENDORSEMENT OF PARTICULAR REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL MOTIVATIONS WERE THOROUGHLY ENTANGLED IN SOME OF THE NFZ PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY FOR SOUTH ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. QUESTION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-STATE ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES WAS A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE, WITH MANY COUNTRIES

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PAGE 03 USUN N 05591 01 OF 03 022344Z

CALLING FOR PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES (NNWS)OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. TEST BAN ISSUE RECEIVED LESS ATTENTION THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS, ALTHOUGH A SINGLE CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED. REFERENCES TO THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY WERE FEW AND GENERALLY NOT FAVORABLE. SUPPORT WAS EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL AS WELL AS DEVELOPING MINIMUM PHYSICAL SECURITY

STANDARDS. END SUMMARY

2. LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST BUT ALSO IN LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, NONPROLIFERATION AND RELATED NUCLEAR ISSUES DOMINATED FIRST COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION OF DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS THIS YEAR. TWELVE OF TWENTY-ONE DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE FIRST COMMITTEE DEALT WITH NONPROLIFERATION OR RELATED MATTERS.

3. NONPROLIFERATION AND NPT. CONSIDERING CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY NUMBER OF NPT PROPONENTS AT BEGINNING OF SESSION THAT FIRST COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES MIGHT BE HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS, DIVISIVE AND CONSEQUENTLY DAMAGING TO NONPROLIFERATION EFFORT, OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S DEBATE WAS QUITE SATISFACTORY. MANY DELEGATIONS, WHILE URGING MORE RAPID PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN NPT ARTICLES, EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR BASIC TREATY STRUCTURE AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF WIDEST POSSIBLE ADHERENCE. SEVERAL SPEAKERS RECOGNIZED, EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY, THAT INDIAN EXPLOSION POSED THREAT TO NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR VIEW THAT ACQUISITION BY NNWS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY FOR ANY PURPOSE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. AMONG DELEGATIONS WHICH WERE MOST ARTICULATE IN SUPPORT OF NPT AND NONPROLIFERATION WERE US, UK, CANAD, NETHERLANDS, JAPAN, FRG, AUSTRALIA, FINLAND, SWEDEN, AND SOVIET BLOC. HEAVY STRESS BY SEC. KISSINGER ON NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS IN SEPTEMBER PLENARY DEBATE, AND THE MORE DETAILED PRESENTATION OF US VIEWS BY SEN. SYMINGTON IN FIRST COMMITTEE ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE FAVORABLE COMMENT. WHILE IT WAS POLITICALLY WELCOME THAT THE NONPROLIFERATION FIGHT WAS LED BY NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES SUCH AS CANADA, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS AND SWEDEN, THE RATHER HIGH US PROFILE ON NON-PROLIFERATION UNQUESTIONABLY SERVED

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PAGE 04 USUN N 05591 01 OF 03 022344Z

OUR INTERESTS.

4. TRADITIONAL OPPONENTS OF NPT WERE PREDICTABLY CRITICAL. FRANCE, WHILE REITERATING ITS 1968 PLEDGE TO ACT AS IF IT WERE A TREATY PARTY, ATTACKED THE NPT AS "DISCRIMINATORY, MISLEADING, ILLUSORY, AND INEFFECTIVE." INDIA, WHILE SAYING IT OPPOSED BOTH VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHARGED THAT NPT IS DISCRIMINATORY SINCE IT ALLOWS CERTAIN STATES TO RETAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE DENYING OTHERS RIGHT TO EXPLOIT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA CALLED NPT A DISCRIMINATORY UNDERTAKING THAT HINDERS DEVELOPMENT OF LESS PRIVILEGED STATES. CHINA RESTATED FAMILIAR VIEW THAT NPT WAS SUPERPOWER DEVICE TO PERPETUATE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY.

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PAGE 01 USUN N 05591 02 OF 03 022344Z

73

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USUN 5591

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 05591 02 OF 03 022344Z

5. SEVERAL PRO-NPT DELEGATIONS FEARED THAT INDIA'S VIEWS ON PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WOULD FIND SUPPORT AMONG NON-ALIGNED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IN DEVELOPING RESOLUTION OF NONPROLIFERATION AND PNES, CO-SPONSORS WERE CONCERNED THAT INDIANS WOULD CAMPAIGN AGAINST RES. HOWEVER, WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR INDIAN POSITIONS DID NOT MATERIALIZE. RESOLUTION ON IAEA WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, URGED ADHERENCE TO NPT WAS ADOPTED IN PLENARY BY 66 (INCLUDING US) IN FAVOR, NONE OPPOSED, AND ONLY NINE ABSTAINING (INCLUDING INDIA, ARGENTINA, AND BRAZIL). RESOLUTION ON NONPROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, AS WELL AS PARAGRAPHS OF THAT RESOLUTION ON WHICH INDIA REQUESTED SEPARATE VOTE, WERE ALL ADOPTED BY FIRST COMMITTEE BY LARGE MARGINS, WITH INDIA ALMOST TOTALLY ISOLATED IN OPPOSITION AND WITH ONLY A FEW ABSTENTIONS, SOME UNRELATED TO INDIAN TEST. THREE PARAGRAPHS DEALING WITH NPT IN MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR FREE ZONE RESOLUTION WERE VOTED SEPARATELY AT INDIA'S REQUEST AND PASSED OVERWHELMINGLY.

6. THESE VOTES WERE SEEN BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS AS SIGNIFICANT DEFEATS FOR INDIA AND FOR ARGUMENTS IT PUT FORWARD IN JUSTIFICATION OF ITS MAY 18 TEST. WHILE VOTES DID INDEED PROVIDE REASSURING EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR NONPROLIFERATION, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT INDIAN DELEGATION DEVOTED LESS EFFORT THAN EXPECTED TO OPPOSING RESES INVOLVING NPT AND DIRECTED ITS ENERGIES TO SECURING ITS OBJECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE ISSUE (SEE BELOW). IT SHOULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT, WHILE ENCOURAGING NUMBER OF NPT HOLDOUTS JOINED IN AFFIRMATIVE VOTES ON SOME KEY QUESTIONS (E.G., CHILE, EGYPT, ISRAEL, PAKISTAN, SPAIN) OTHERS WHOSE ACTIVITIES IN NUCLEAR FIELD ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (E.G., ARGENTINA, BRAZIL) MAINTAINED THEIR NEGATIVE POSITIONS. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH MANY NPT PARTIES AND NEAR-PARTIES (E.G., FRG, NETHERLANDS, JAPAN) WERE WILLING TO CLOSE RANKS IN DEFENSE OF SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, DIFFERENCES CONTINUED TO EXIST AMONG THEM ON IMPLEMENTATION OF NPT AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SURFACE AS WE APPROACH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE.

7. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES). QUESTION OF  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 USUN N 05591 02 OF 03 022344Z

PNES WAS A MAJOR ITEM IN DEBATE. NUMEROUS DELS TOOK POSITION THAT, SINCE TECHNOLOGY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IS INDISTIN-

GUISHABLE, INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PNES SUCH AS THOSE ENVISAGED IN NPT ARTICLE V ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PREVENT FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FEW DELEGATIONS, HOWEVER, CALLED FOR EARLY ELABORATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

8. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING SWEDEN, CANADA, AUSTRIA, AUSTRALIA, NETHERLANDS, FINLAND, AND UK HELD THAT FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PNES HAVE NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. FOR THIS REASON, NEXT STEP SHOULD BE THOROUGH INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF PNE IN APPROPRIATE FORUMS--IAEA, CCD AND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE; IF PNES ARE PROVED WORTHWHILE, NON-DISCRIMINATORY INTERNATIONAL REGIME WOULD NEED TO BE SET UP. MOST DELEGATIONS WERE VAGUE ON NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME, LEAVING OPEN SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHETHER PNE SERVICES SHOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY TO NPT PARTIES OR TO NON-PARTIES AS WELL. SEVERAL STATED THAT PROCEDURES OF AN INTERNATIONAL PNE SERVICE SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AND TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES, BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. BOTH SWEDEN AND JAPAN REITERATED VIEW THAT PNE REGIME SHOULD INVOLVE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF PNES ON TERRITORIES OF NUCLEAR STATES.

9. INDIANS PRESSED LINE THAT DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES DOES NOT POSE THREAT TO PROLIFERATION. THEY ALSO HELD THAT FEASIBILITY OF PNE TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.

10. COMMITTEE VOTE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND PNE RESOLUTION INDICATED LITTLE SUPPORT FOR INDIAN-BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE POSITION. DRAFT RESOLUTION-CALLING FOR EXAMINATION OF PNES IN CCD, IAEA AND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND ASSERTING THAT PNES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE ENVISAGED IN NPT--WAS ADOPTED 91(US)-3-11, WITH INDIA VOTING NO AND YUGOSLAVIA THE ONLY NPT PARTY ABSTAINING.

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PAGE 04 USUN N 05591 02 OF 03 022344Z

11. NUCLEAR FREE ZONES (NFZS) REGIONAL APPROACHES TO NONPROLIFERATION WERE A MAJOR FOCUS ON ACTIVITY THIS YEAR ALTHOUGH AT LEAST INsofar AS THE SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST PROPOSALS ARE CONCERNED, ARMS CONTROL DIMENSIONS OF INITIATIVES WERE TO A LARGE DEGREE OVER SHADOWED BY HIGHLY CHARGED REGIONAL POLITICAL FACTORS. TWO RESOLUTIONS ON SOUTH ASIA, ONE PAKISTANI AND ONE INDIAN, WERE BOTH PASSED BY WIDE MARGINS, BUT WITH MANY MORE ABSTENTIONS THAN ON ANY OTHER NFZ RES.

ORIGINAL PAKISTANI DRAFT WOULD HAVE DECLARED SOUTH ASIA REGION  
A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE AND CALLED FOR REGIONAL CONSULTA-  
TIONS TO ELABORATE AGREEMENT BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
BUT PERMITTING PNES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.  
DRAFT DID NOT PROSPER FOR SEVERAL REASONS. SEVERAL  
STATES, RECOGNIZING RESOLUTION'S POLITICAL INTENT,  
DID NOT WANT TO IRRITATE INDIA; SOME, INCLUDING  
WESTERN DELEGATIONS AND A FEW NON-ALIGNED, WERE CON-  
CERNED ABOUT LEGITIMIZING PNE DEVELOPMENT BY NON-NUCLEAR  
WEAPON STATES; SOME FELT AGREEMENT AMONG STATES IN  
REGIONA SHOULD PRECEDE GA ACTION.

12. RECOGNIZING THAT, EVEN WITH LUKEWARM SUPPORT,  
PAKISTANI RESOLUTION WOULD BE ADOPTED, INDIAN DELEGA-  
TION TABLED NON-CONTROVERSIAL, PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION  
OF ITS OWN; AND PAKISTANIS WATERED DOWN THEIR DRAFT  
IN ATTEMPT TO GAIN WIDER SUPPORT ALTHOUGH THEY RETAINED IMPLICIT  
LEGITIMATION OF INDIGENOUS PNES. DESPIRT RESERVA-  
TIONS CONCERNING PAKISTANI NFZ CONCEPT AND DISBELIEF  
THAT SANFZ WOULD ACTUALLY MATERIALIZE, MOST DELEGA-  
TIONS SUPPORTED BOTH RESOLUTIONS IN EFFORT TO APPEAR  
EVEN-HANDED AND TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR NFZ CONCEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 USUN N 05591 03 OF 03 030043Z

73

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-04 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-06 IO-10 ISO-00

AEC-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NASA-01

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USUN 5591  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 USUN N 05591 03 OF 03 030043Z

13. MIDDLE EAST NFZ. ORIGINAL IRANIAN DRAFT WAS PROCEDURAL, PROVIDING FOR DIRECT CONSULTATIONS AMONG REGIONAL STATES. ARABS, HOWEVER, WERE INTERESTED IN ISOLATING ISRAEL AND PLACING PRESSURES ON IT TO ADHERE TO NPT. THUS, RESOLUTION AS ADOPTED OMITTED REFERENCE TO CONSULTATIONS AND DECLARED THAT, IN ORDER TO ADVANCE MENFZ, IT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR ALL PARTIES IN AREA TO PROCLAIM IMMEDIATELY THEIR INTENTION NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ISRAEL ABSTAINED ON GROUNDS THAT MENFZ ARRANGEMENT COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH DIRECT CONSULTATIONS AMONG STATES OF REGION, BUT IT VOICED INTEREST IN MENFZ IDEA AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN DIPLOMATIC MOVES TO ADVANCE NFZ OBJECTIVE. RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY OVERWHELMING MARGIN OF 103(US)-0-3; SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING US, SWEDEN, CANADA, AND ITALY, PUT ON RECORD VIEW THAT NFZS MUST BE PRODUCT OF CONSULTATIONS AND AGREEMENT OF KEY REGIONAL STATES.

14. FIRST COMMITTEE PASSED NIGERIAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION ON AFRICAN NFZ WITH ONLY THREE ABSTENTIONS. ONLY FRANCE, WHICH OBJECTED TO INCLUSION OF FRENCH ISLANDS IN ZONE, AND US AND UK, WHICH HAD PROBLEMS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE ASSUMED BY NUCLEAR POWERS WITH RESPECT TO ZONE (I.E., NON-USE, TRANSPORT



RESTRICTIONS) DID NOT SUPPORT RESOLUTION. (BRITISH HAVE INDICATED THAT, WHEN RESOLUTION COMES UP IN PLENARY, THEY PLAN TO VOTE IN FAVOR AND HAVE URGED US TO DO THE SAME.) SOUTH AFRICAN DEL, SUSPENDED FROM UNGA, WAS NOT PRESENT. TWO RESOLUTIONS ON TREATY OF TLAHELCO--ONE CALLING ON USSR TO ADHERE TO PROTOCOL II, THE OTHER CALLING ON US AND FRANCE TO ADHERE TO PROTOCOL I--WERE ADOPTED ROUTINELY. LEAST CONTROVERSIAL NFZ RESOLUTION WAS FINNISH PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF NFZS UNDER CCD AUSPICES, APPROVED 114(US)-0-2. ONE OF TWO RESES ADOPTED ON INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE INVOLVED NUCLEAR RELATED ISSUE BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH NFZS.

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PAGE 03 USUN N 05591 03 OF 03 030043Z

15. SECURITY ASSURANCES. A RECURRING THEME DURING DEBATE WAS DESIRE BY NON-NUCLEAR STATES TO RECEIVE ASSURANCES BY NUCLEAR POWERS THAT THEIR SECURITY WOULD BE PROTECTED AGAINST NUCLEAR THREAT. FEEDING THIS DESIRE WAS REITERATION BY CHINESE OF THEIR LONG-STANDING NO-FIRST USE POLICY AND FRENCH STATEMENT OF MORE FORTHCOMING POLICY ON NON-USE AGAINST NNWS. QUESTION OF ASSURANCES CAME UP MOST FREQUENTLY IN CONTEXT OF NFZS, AND VARIOUS NON-NUCLEARS, PARTICULARLY FROM DEVELOPING REGIONS, ARGUED THAT NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD DECLARE INTENTION NOT TO USE, THREATEN TO USE, OR DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES. BECAUSE OF REFERENCES IN RESOLUTIONS TO THIS POINT, WE DID NOT SUPPORT AFRICAN AND PAKISTANI SOUTH ASIAN NFZ RESES, BUT WERE ABLE TO VOTE YES ON MENFZ AFTER PERSUADING IRANIAN DELEGATION TO WATER DOWN PARA ON NUCLEAR POWERS' OBLIGATIONS. WE ALSO JOINED IN CONSENSUS ON PAKISTANI RES ON STRENGTHENING SECURITY OF NNWS AFTER PAKISTANIS DELETED CALL FOR NON-USE PLEDGE AT OUR REQUEST.

16. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND TEST BAN ISSUES. MAY FIRST COMMITTEE SPEAKERS REFERRED TO COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN ARTICLE VI OF NPT AND URGED MORE RAPID PROGRESS BY US AND USSR. SOME DELS, INCLUDING SWEDEN, TOOK THE VIEW THAT SUPERPOWERS WOULD HAVE TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO EXTENT THEY FAILED TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE VI ADEQUATELY. ONLY A FEW, HOWEVER, INCLUDING INDIA, ARGUED THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (SO-CALLED "VERTICAL/ PROLIFERATION) SHOULD RECEIVE MORE ATTENTION THAN SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TECHNOLOGY. CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND OTHERS EXPRESSED VIEW TO CONTRARY THAT, WHILE ACCUMULATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS BY EXISTING NUCLEAR POWERS CANNOT BE EXCUSED AND MUST EVENTUALLY BE STOPPED, URGENT STEPS AGAINST "HORIZONTAL" PROLIFERATION SHOULD NOT BE MADE HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. MEXICAN-SPONSORED RES ON SALT, CALLING ON US AND USSR TO ACCELERATE PACE AND BROADEN SCOPE OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS, WAS ADOPTED BY 88-1-21(INCLUDING US, USSR), WITH MINIMUM OF DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE, WE ABSTAINED ON GROUNDS THAT

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PAGE 04 USUN N 05591 03 OF 03 030043Z

SALT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED ALONG LINES SET BY PARTIES THEMSELVES.

17. AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, MANY SPEAKERS SINGLED OUT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) AS THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY THE NUCLEAR TESTING POWERS TO STRENGTHEN NONPROLIFERATION. HOWEVER, LARGELY BECAUSE OF EMPHASIS AT CURRENT SESSION ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS NFZS AND PNES, THE TEXT BAN ISSUE RECEIVED LESS ATTENTION THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. AFTER CONSIDERING CALLING FOR HALT TO ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, TEST BAN ADVOCATES, FEARING INDIAN-LED OPPOSITION AND MANY ABSTENTIONS, DECIDED TO COVER ONLY WEAPONS TESTS (AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS). RES CONDEMNING ALL WEAPONS TESTS AND CALLING FOR MORATORIUM ON FURTHER TESTING PENDING CONCLUSION OF CTB WAS ADOPTED 72-3-30(INCLUDING US, SOME WESTERN DELS, SOVIET BLOC). UNLIKE RECENT YEARS, WHEN THERE WAS A CHOICE BETWEEN MILITANT AND MORE MODERATE CTB RESES, THERE WAS ONLY ONE THIS YEAR. ACCORDINGLY, NUMBER OF US ALLIES (INCLUDING JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, ITALY) CLAIMING NEED TO SUPPORT SOME CTB RES AT UNGA, VOTED FOR FIRST TIME TO CONDEMN ALL WEAPONS TESTING.

18. REFERENCES TO THRESHOLD TEST BAN (TTB) TREATY WERE MADE BY ONLY A FEW SPEAKERS. ONLY UK AND SOVIET BLOC STATEMENTS ON TTB COULD BE CONSIDERED FAVORABLE. FRG SAID THAT, "IF TTB SERVES THE PURPOSE OF CONTAINING THE ARMS RACE," IT WOULD BE WELCOME. JAPAN URGED LOWERING THRESHOLD AND MULTILATERALIZING THE TTB AGREEMENT. SWEDEN TERMED TREATY "OF UNCERTAIN VALUE," AND FINLAND CALLED IT A "DISMALLY" SMALL STEP, ALTHOUGH IN RIGHT DIRECTION. SEVERAL SPEAKERS, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT TTB VERIFICATION PROVISIONS COULD SERVE AS USEFUL PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE TESTING RESTRAINTS.

19. SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY. SOVIET BLOC, FRG, SWEDEN, AUSTRIA, AND JAPAN FAVORED EFFORTS BY NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO AGREE TO MINIMUM STANDARDS ON THEIR TRANSFERS AND SUPPORTED WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA

SAFEGUARDS. A FEW STATES, INCLUDING FRG, CALLED ON  
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PAGE 05 USUN N 05591 03 OF 03 030043Z

NNWS NOT PARTY TO NPT TO SUBJECT THEIR ENTIRE FULE  
CYCLES TO SAFEGUARDS. SWEDEN REITERATED APPEAL FOR  
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF FOSSILE MATERIAL.  
NETHERLANDS, FRG, SWEDEN, CANADA, AUSTRIA, AND INDIA  
ALL URGED IAEA TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO MINIMUM  
PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS.  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 02 DEC 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740349-0526  
**From:** USUN NEW YORK  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19741266/aaaaceuj.tel  
**Line Count:** 561  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
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**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE DISARMAMENT WRAP-UP: NONPROLIFERA- TION AND RELATED NUCLEAR ISSUES  
**TAGS:** PARM, UN, UNGA  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005